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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1980, after pleading guilty to burglary and theft by stolen property, Danny Bearden was sentenced to three years’ probation and
ordered to pay $750 in fines and restitution: $200 within two days and the
remaining balance within four months. 1 Mr. Bearden borrowed money
from his parents to make the first payment, but a month later, was laid off
from his job and could not find other work. 2 Shortly before the remaining
balance was due, he was forced to notify his probation officer that he
would be late with his payment. 3 In response, the trial court revoked his
probation, and Mr. Bearden was ordered to serve the remainder of his
probationary period in prison. 4 Two years later, the Supreme Court set
him free, holding that where a person on probation makes bona fide efforts to pay the fines they owe but is unable to do so through no fault of
their own, it is “fundamentally unfair” to imprison them based on their
poverty. 5 The Court thus affirmed the unconstitutionality of debtors’ prisons, 6 which had been abolished by federal law in 1833, 150 years earlier,
as well as by a number of states shortly thereafter. 7
The Supreme Court’s ruling has seemingly gone unheard: the practice of incarcerating people for their inability to pay endures. 8 Today, local courts continue to send people bills for unpaid debts that they incur
merely by being arrested—and then sentence them to jail when they cannot afford to pay the ever-increasing fines and fees that are associated
with the criminal legal system. 9 For instance, in 2014, every state except

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662 (1983).
Id. at 662-63.
3 Id. at 663.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 667-69.
6 This Note refers to debtors’ prisons (the historical practice of incarcerating people for
private, contractual debts) and debtors’ prison schemes and practices such as fines and fees
(the modern practice of charging people who enter the criminal legal system fines and fees
and then incarcerating them for failing to pay) interchangeably.
7 Eli Hager, Debtors’ Prisons, Then and Now: FAQ, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2015,
7:15 AM), https://perma.cc/U4UH-VS7M. For an in-depth, historical overview of debtors’
prison practices in the United States, see Jill Lepore, I.O.U., How We Used to Treat Debtors,
NEW YORKER (Apr. 6, 2009), https://perma.cc/PE9Z-J6Q9.
8 See Olivia C. Jerjian, The Debtors’ Prison Scheme: Yet Another Bar in the Birdcage of
Mass Incarceration of Communities of Color, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 24245 (2017) (discussing the evolution of debtors’ prisons, including the practice of “leasing”
Black men convicted of misdemeanors to private companies to pay off their debt, as well as
the skyrocketing fines and fees that modern courts charge).
9 See, e.g., Hager, supra note 7; Jessica Pishko, Locked Up for Being Poor, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 25, 2015), https://perma.cc/KPN4-J8PG; Tina Rosenberg, Out of Debtors’ Prison, with
Law as the Key, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/XES9-99VX; Joseph
1
2
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for Hawaii charged people for electronic monitoring devices, which they
wear only because they are ordered to do so. 10 There are countless stories
of people being sent to jail for failing to pay private probation fees, 11 medical debt, 12 credit card debt, 13 or for failing to appear in court to pay off
traffic violations that they cannot afford. 14 Many of the fines and fees that
municipal courts charge are driven by city revenue goals. 15
Advocates challenging these contemporary debtors’ prison practices
in federal court have found some success, but municipalities unwilling to
dam their revenue streams are now arguing that municipal courts cannot
be sued because they are arms of the state and are thus immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment. Whether municipal courts should receive Eleventh Amendment protection is an open question made all the
more complex by the Eleventh Amendment and arm-of-the-state doctrine’s muddled history and the circuits’ disparate attempts at applying
what limited Supreme Court precedent is available.
This Note argues that the rise of litigation against debtors’ prisons
calls for renewed attention to the arm-of-the-state test’s consistency with
the Eleventh Amendment’s original purpose, and that, because of their
local funding and control, municipal courts should not receive sovereign
immunity. Part I discusses municipalities’ contemporary use of debtors’
prisons practices like fines and fees to generate revenue, how litigants
have challenged those fines and fees, and how municipalities are contesting their responsibility. Part II examines the Eleventh Amendment’s origins and purpose, which are the foundation for the arm-of-the-state doctrine. Part III lays out the Supreme Court’s articulation of the arm-of-thestate doctrine and the circuits’ incoherent attempts to craft their own armof-the-state tests. Finally, Part IV suggests first that, specifically in the
Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM),
https://perma.cc/VG2R-JX4Z.
10 Shapiro, supra note 9. In 2018, the non-profit Equal Justice Under Law filed a classaction suit against a private company which provides electronic monitoring services to multiple jurisdictions in California, alleging that the company extorts fees from poor people through
threat of incarceration. Complaint at 2, Edwards v. Leaders in Cmty. Alternatives, Inc., No.
4:18-cv-04609, 2018 WL 6591449 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/5LWMDWEU.
11 Hannah Rappleye & Lisa Riordan Seville, The Town That Turned Poverty into a Prison
Sentence, NATION (Mar. 14, 2014), https://perma.cc/XNQ9-PVL5.
12 Susie An, Unpaid Bills Land Some Debtors Behind Bars, NPR (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:01
AM), https://perma.cc/G6EQ-524A.
13 Chris Serres & Glenn Howatt, In Jail for Being in Debt, STAR TRIBUNE (Mar. 17, 2011,
4:40 PM), https://perma.cc/LS4F-ZHAC.
14 Radley Balko, How Municipalities in St. Louis County, Mo., Profit from Poverty,
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://perma.cc/9SM8-YMZ4.
15 See Hager, supra note 7; ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW
DEBTORS’ PRISONS 8-9 (2010), https://perma.cc/4Z2B-SHP8.
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context of debtors’ prison litigation, municipal courts should not receive
sovereign immunity, and second that, in order to realign the arm-of-thestate doctrine with the Eleventh Amendment’s purpose as described by
the Supreme Court, further consideration must be given to focusing the
arm-of-the-state test on funding and local control.
I.
A.

LITIGATION AGAINST MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS AND
MUNICIPAL PUSHBACK

Debtors’ Prisons as Revenue Sources

As both commentators and court administrators themselves have
noted, the resurgence of debtors’ prisons is closely linked to shrinking
municipal budgets and the recent financial crisis. 16 In 2003, the Conference of State Court Administrators (“COSCA”) warned that “state governments today are experiencing the worst fiscal crisis in many decades,”
and that “deep budget cuts . . . are forcing court closures.” 17 While
COSCA emphasized that state legislatures should fund state courts, it
noted that, “[i]n a tight budget environment, increasing fees and fines . . .
may be a viable option” and that “enhanced collection of uncollected
fines” would generate revenue. 18 In 2012, COSCA released a follow-up
policy paper, aptly titled Courts Are Not Revenue Centers, cautioning its
members that courts should “not impose unreasonable financial obligations assessed to fund other governmental services” and should “strive for
a revenue structure that provides access, adequacy, stability, equity, transparency and simplicity”—an implicit rebuke of COSCA’s earlier position. 19 Four years later, COSCA released yet another policy paper, this

16 Eric Balaban, Shining a Light into Dark Corners: A Practitioner’s Guide to Successful
Advocacy to Curb Debtor’s Prisons, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 275, 276 (2014); Alexes Harris et
al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United
States, 115 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1753, 1793 n.30 (2010); Jerjian, supra note 8, at 248; Torie
Atkinson, Note, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become Crushing Debt in the Shadow
of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 190, 195-96 (2016).
17 CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, POSITION PAPER ON STATE JUDICIAL
BRANCH BUDGETS IN TIMES OF FISCAL CRISIS 2 (2003), https://perma.cc/E27L-JQ98. COSCA
is an organization consisting of all fifty states’ state court administrators that advocates for the
improvement of state court systems.
18 Id. at 13-14.
19 CARL REYNOLDS & JEFF HALL, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS,
COURTS ARE NOT REVENUE CENTERS 1, 13 (2012), https://perma.cc/A66V-N377.
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time calling for courts to put an end to practices that encourage incarceration based on failure to pay fines and fees.20 COSCA has framed its policy papers as part of the organization’s supposedly long-standing commitment to reducing or eliminating court funding through fees, 21 but
COSCA called for just the opposite in 2003 when it suggested that increasing court fines and fees was a viable option for generating municipal
revenue. 22 It is no wonder that cities and counties concerned about finding
revenue streams to shore up their budgets have aggressively charged and
collected fines and fees, pulling people into the criminal legal system to
bolster municipal bottom lines. 23
The city of Ferguson, Missouri, illustrates this phenomenon all too
well. 24 In its 2015 report on the investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, the United States Department of Justice described the city’s
municipal courts’ priority as “maximizing revenue,” 25 not the “fair administration of justice.” 26 Ferguson “[c]ity, police, and court officials . . .
worked in concert to maximize revenue at every stage of the enforcement
process.” 27 In fact, Ferguson city officials lauded then-Municipal Judge
Brockmeyer for creating fees that the Department of Justice’s report described as “abusive.” 28 Correspondence between the Ferguson Court
Clerk and Judge Brockmeyer emphasized the importance of meeting the
court’s targets for fine and fee collection. 29 Defendants who could not pay
the fines and fees set by the Ferguson court were jailed. 30
Unfortunately, Ferguson is not alone: in 2012, thirty-eight American
cities received ten percent or more of their revenue from fines and fees,

20 See ARTHUR W. PEPIN, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, THE END OF
DEBTORS’ PRISONS: EFFECTIVE COURT POLICIES FOR SUCCESSFUL COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL
FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS (2016), https://perma.cc/JZL8-FGP2.
21
Id. at 2.
22 CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, supra note 17, at 13-14.
23 Hager, supra note 7; ACLU, supra note 15, at 8-9.
24 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 9-15 (2015) [hereinafter “FERGUSON REPORT”], https://perma.cc/PPH4EXY8 (describing Ferguson city officials’ and police officers’ revenue-driven practices).
25 Id. at 9.
26 Id. at 15.
27 Id. at 10.
28 Id. at 14. These fines and fees included a $50 fee for every time a person had a pending
municipal arrest warrant cleared and a fine for failure to appear that increased every time the
defendant failed to appear or pay the fine.
29 FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 24, at 14-15.
30 First Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv00253-AGF (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/TK5G-PZPD.
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and many more received at least five percent.31 More recently, in response
to multiple local judges setting fines to generate revenue for their municipalities, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a memorandum to all municipal judges emphasizing that “[t]he imposition of punishment should
in no way be linked to a town’s need for revenue.” 32 Municipal courts
across the country have thus revived debtors’ prisons practices through
the use of fines and fees, effectively incarcerating people because they are
poor. 33
B.

Legal Challenges to Debtors’ Prisons Schemes Face Municipal
Pushback

In the past decade, class action lawsuits have emerged as an effective
strategy for civil rights organizations and advocates to challenge municipalities and counties’ practice of using court- or law enforcement-imposed fines and fees to generate revenue, and incarcerating people who
cannot pay those fines and fees. The National Center for State Courts,
founded at Chief Justice Burger’s urging in order to provide authoritative
information on local courts, 34 reports fifty-two cases filed in state and
federal court between 2012 and 2018 challenging fines and fees. 35 Organizations such as Equal Justice Under Law, the Southern Center for Human
Rights, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the American Civil Liberties Union have filed suits alleging modern-day debtors’ prison schemes

31 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST COMMUNITIES OF
COLOR 20-22 (2017) (citing Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black America, PRICEONOMICS (June 24,
2016), https://perma.cc/T28M-5ZH2), https://perma.cc/DA2V-AD29.
32
Memorandum on Fines and Penalties in Municipal Court from Stuart Rabner, Chief
Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, to All Judges of the Municipal and Superior Courts
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/2P5G-QCN6.
33 See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 16, at 194-98 (2016); Mollie Bryant & Jerry Mitchell,
Lawsuit: Jackson Runs What Amounts to Debtors’ Prison, CLARION-LEDGER (Oct. 13, 2015),
https://perma.cc/2Q3L-YM9Z; Nicholas K. Geranios & Gene Johnson, ACLU Lawsuit: Benton County Jailing People Who Can’t Pay Court Fines, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015, 5:12
PM), https://perma.cc/UHS7-5SXW; Lucas Sullivan & Dylan Tussel, Convicts Entering
Franklin County Jail Must Pay $40, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Nov. 30, 2011, 10:38 AM),
https://perma.cc/8KCR-FJEY; Tanzina Vega, Biloxi Accused of Running “Modern-Day Debtors’ Prison.,” CNN MONEY (Oct. 21, 2015, 2:05 PM), https://perma.cc/JVU2-G59A.
34 About Us, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://perma.cc/NTT3-FARL (last visited
May 10, 2019).
35 States That Have Recent Litigation Related to Fines, Fees, or Bail Practices, NAT’ L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://perma.cc/PVY9-CRD4 (last visited May 10, 2019).
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against cities in Alabama, 36 Arkansas, 37 Georgia, 38 Louisiana, 39 Mississippi, 40 Missouri, 41 South Carolina, 42 and Texas, 43 among others. Civil
rights advocates have targeted multiple cities in Missouri specifically: in
2015, ArchCity Defenders 44 filed twin class action suits against the cities
of Jennings and Ferguson, alleging that both cities had maintained brazen
debtors’ prison schemes for years with the express purpose of generating

See First Amended Class Action Complaint, Mitchell v. City of Montgomery, No. 2:14cv-186-MEF (M.D. Ala. May 23, 2014).
37 See Complaint – Class Action, Dade v. City of Sherwood, No. 4:16-cv-00602-JM (E.D.
Ark. Aug. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/C96L-3L52. The parties reached a settlement in 2017.
See Stipulation Regarding Settlement, Dade v. City of Sherwood, No. 4:16-cv-00602-JM
(E.D. Ark. Nov. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/Y8LU-HFN4.
38 Complaint at 1-2, Jones v. Grady Cty., No. 1:13-cv-00156-WLS (M.D. Ga. Sept. 24,
2013). The District Court ultimately approved a settlement agreement. See Order Granting
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement at 9, 14, Jones v. Grady Cty., No. 1:13-cv-00156WLS (M.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2015). See also Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Brucker v. City of Doraville, No. 1:18-cv-02375-RWS (N.D. Ga. May 23, 2018).
39 See First Amended Class Action Complaint, Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:15cv-4479-SSV-JCW (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2015).
40 See Class Action Complaint, Bell v. City of Jackson, No. 3:15-cv-00732-TSL-RHW
(S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2015); Class Action Complaint, Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-cv348 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2015).
41 See Civil Rights Class Action Complaint, Whitner v. City of Pagedale, No. 4:15-cv01655-RWS (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4, 2015). In 2018, the presiding judge approved a consent decree
providing for steps to reform Pagedale’s municipal court practices and city prosecutions. See
Consent Decree, Whitner v. City of Pagedale, No. 4:15-cv-01655-RWS (E.D. Mo. May 21,
2018).
42 See Class Action Second Amended Complaint, Brown v. Lexington Cty., No. 3:17-cv1426-MBS-SVH (D.S.C. Oct. 19, 2017).
43 See Class Action Complaint, West v. City of Santa Fe, No. 3:16-cv-00309 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 3, 2016).
44 ArchCity Defenders is a nonprofit civil rights law firm based in St. Louis, Missouri,
dedicated to combating the criminalization of poverty and state violence against poor people
and people of color. Who We Are, ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, https://perma.cc/ZWE9-F3VL (last
visited Dec. 27, 2019). Since its founding in 2009, the firm has filed numerous actions against
municipalities in the St. Louis area challenging police misconduct, debtors’ prisons, cash bail,
and inhumane jail conditions, among other issues. Civil Rights Litigation, ARCHCITY
DEFENDERS, https://perma.cc/247M-LL3V (last visited Dec. 27, 2019).
36
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revenue. 45 ArchCity Defenders went on to file similar suits against the
cities of St. Ann, 46 Maplewood, 47 and Florissant. 48
While some debtors’ prison class actions have ended in settlements
or consent degrees, 49 a number of municipalities have objected to being
held liable for their courts’ actions. The city of Ferguson moved to dismiss ArchCity Defenders’ suit in 2016 50 and again in 2017, 51 claiming in
both motions that the Ferguson municipal court is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. 52 Both motions were denied, 53 but Ferguson moved so again in 2019, insisting that the city has no control over the
municipal court, that the municipal court is part of Missouri’s state circuit
court system, and that the municipal court is thus entitled to sovereign
immunity. 54 The city of Maplewood also moved to dismiss ArchCity Defenders’ suit, arguing that the Maplewood Municipal Court is an arm of
the state and thus protected from suit by the Eleventh Amendment.55 The

Class Action Complaint at 1, 36, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-00252-CEJ
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015); Class Action Complaint at 33-34, Fant v. Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv00253-SPM (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015). The city of Jennings settled in late 2016, agreeing to
compensate people who were incarcerated for failing to pay fines and fees. See Order Granting
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Jenkins v. Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-00252-CEJ (E.D.
Mo. Dec. 14, 2016).
46 See Second Amended Class Action Complaint, Thomas v. City of St. Ann, No. 4:16cv-01302-RWS (E.D. Mo. July 21, 2017).
47 See Class Action Complaint, Webb v. City of Maplewood, No. 4:16-cv-01703 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 1, 2016).
48 See Class Action Complaint, Baker v. City of Florissant, No. 4:16-cv-01693 (E.D. Mo.
Oct. 31, 2016).
49 See supra notes 37-38, 41, 45.
50 See Defendant’s Motion to Partially Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Fant
v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253-AGF (E.D. Mo. Apr. 27, 2016).
51 See Defendant City of Ferguson’s Corrected Motion to Dismiss Counts I Through III
and V Through VII for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No.
4:15-cv-00253-AGF (E.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2017).
52 Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Partially Dismiss Plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253-AGF (E.D. Mo. Apr.
27, 2016); Memorandum in Support of Defendant the City of Ferguson’s Corrected Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 12-17, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15cv-00253-AGF (E.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2017).
53 See Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253-AGF, 2016 WL 6696065 (E.D. Mo.
Nov. 15, 2016); Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253-AGF, 2018 BL 48196 (E.D. Mo.
Feb. 13, 2018) (denying Ferguson’s 2016 and 2017 motions to dismiss, respectively).
54 The City of Ferguson’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Counts I
Through III and V Through VII for Failure to Join an Indispensable Party at 2, 25, Fant v. City
of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253-AGF (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2019).
55 Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Class Action
Complaint for Failure to State a Cause of Action at 13, Webb v. City of Maplewood, No. 4:16cv-01703-CDP (E.D. Mo. Dec. 29, 2016).
45
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District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the city’s motion 56 and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the city’s interlocutory appeal, holding that the city of Maplewood can be held liable for
unconstitutional policies or customs even if all individual officials participating in those policies are immune from suit. 57 St. Ann moved to dismiss on identical grounds, arguing that the “alleged wrongs against [the
plaintiffs] relate back, not to St. Ann, but to the municipal court division
in St. Ann, an arm-of-the-state and the real party in interest” which is
protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. 58
To date, cities’ attempts to sidestep liability for their debtors’ prisons
by claiming that the local court is an arm of the state and distinct from the
city itself have not succeeded, 59 but advocates who seek to challenge debtors’ prisons schemes by suing the cities and courts perpetrating them face
an open question: whether municipal courts are arms of the state protected
from suit by the Eleventh Amendment. 60 The arm-of-the-state doctrine’s
muddled articulation offers little help in discerning an answer.
II.

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT’S MURKY ORIGINS AND LIMITATIONS
The Amendment’s Purpose

A.

An overview of the Eleventh Amendment’s purpose is helpful in understanding the origins and disarray of the arm-of-the-state doctrine.
However, such discussion must begin with the acknowledgement that
“step[ping] through the looking glass of the Eleventh Amendment leads

56

2017).

Webb v. City of Maplewood, No. 4:16-cv-1703, 2017 WL 2418011 (E.D. Mo. June 5,

Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 487-88 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 389 (2018). The circuit court noted that, even if the municipal court is a separate and
distinct entity over which the city has no control, “the City will have a defense on the merits
but not immunity from suit.” Id. at 486.
58 Memorandum in Support of Defendant the City of St. Ann’s Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 5, Thomas v. City of St. Ann, No. 4:16-cv-01302-RWS
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2017). The court denied the motion, rejecting St. Ann’s argument that it is
immune from suit even if all of the individuals identified as participants in the contested practices are immune from suit. Order at 2, Thomas v. City of St. Ann, No. 4:16-cv-01302-RWS
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2018).
59 See supra notes 53, 57-58.
60 Balaban, supra note 16, at 280-81.
57
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to a wonderland of judicially created and perpetuated fiction and paradox.” 61 Ratified in response 62 to Chisholm v. Georgia, 63 the Amendment’s explicitly stated function is to prevent federal courts from hearing
suits against a state brought by citizens of another state or a foreign state.64
However, despite the Amendment’s concise language, 65 the Supreme
Court has expanded its meaning to protect states from being sued by their
own citizens, 66 by foreign states, 67 and by Native tribes. 68 “As so construed, the Amendment is in substantial tension with the rule-of-law axiom that for every federal right there must be a remedy enforceable in the
federal court: [people] . . . cannot enforce their federal rights in federal
court suits against the states.” 69 The modern conception of state sovereign
immunity thus is a “hodgepodge of confusing and intellectually
indefensible” judicially developed and maintained creation.70
Many have written on 71—and debated—the underlying purpose and
scope of the Eleventh Amendment and of state sovereign immunity. One

Spicer v. Hilton, 618 F.2d 232, 235 (3d Cir. 1980).
Id.; see also Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 515 (1978) (“The one interpretation of the eleventh amendment to which everyone subscribes is that it was intended to overturn Chisholm v.
Georgia.”).
63 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (entering a default judgment
against the state of Georgia in a suit by citizens of South Carolina to recover on confiscated
bonds).
64 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
65 The Eleventh Amendment states in its entirety that “[t]he Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
66 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11, 15 (1890) (holding that a citizen of a state may
not sue that state in federal court on a claim arising under federal law unless the state consents).
67 See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
68 See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatack, 501 U.S. 775, 779-82 (1991).
69
Carlos Manuel Vásquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683,
1686 (1997).
70 John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1891 (1983).
71 See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 70, at 1892 (placing the Amendment in its historical
context to argue that the Amendment is limited to preventing “the judicial power of the United
States [from] extend[ing] to an action against a state if the only basis for federal jurisdiction
is the presence of a diverse or alien party.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in
Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 974 (2000) (questioning the assumption that nineteenth century
remedies define what the Constitution requires and prohibits of remedies against states); John
E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1413, 1422 (1975) (describing the connection between Article III and the Eleventh Amendment as defining the scope of federal court jurisdiction).
61
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predominant theory is that, in deciding Chisholm v. Georgia, 72 the Supreme Court abandoned the Constitution’s Framers’ intent that states be
immune from private suit, and that the Amendment was enacted in order
to restore that original understanding. 73 The Supreme Court endorsed this
notion, noting that “[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions
are postulates which limit and control. There is . . . the postulate that
States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been ‘a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.’” 74
Two centuries of “tortured reading” of the Eleventh Amendment75
led to the Supreme Court’s articulation of two entwined rationales for
state sovereign immunity: the protection of state sovereignty from the offense of a state’s being haled into court against its will, and the insulation
of the state treasury from the judgments of federal courts. 76 Commentators have argued that state sovereign immunity serves a number of additional interests—allowing government to operate more efficiently, 77 restricting the federal government’s ability to create liabilities that bind
state governments, 78 and protecting the policy decisions of popularlyelected officials 79—all of which reflect the Supreme Court’s focus on federalism in developing Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. 80
B.

Bypassing Eleventh Amendment Immunity by Suing Local Entities

Over the past century, the Supreme Court has carved out caveats to
the broad protections that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity offers to states. There are three major exceptions: Congressional abrogation

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
Field, supra note 62, at 515. See also Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890); Alan D. Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment (A Case of the White Knight’s Green Whiskers), 5 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 7, 9 (1967).
74 Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322–23 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
75 DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAW: THE NEW
FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 148 (2005).
76 Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002); Hess v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1994); Alex E. Rogers, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-ofthe-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (1992).
77 CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 153 (1972).
78 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES
WITH THE STATES 3–4 (2002).
79 JACOBS, supra note 77, at 152.
80 For additional in-depth commentary on the passage of the Eleventh Amendment and
the ongoing debate over its doctrinal roots, see Field, supra note 62; Jackson, supra note 71.
72
73
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of state sovereign immunity, 81 state waiver of sovereign immunity, 82 and
suits brought under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. 83 However, these exceptions place constraints on Congress’ power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity 84 and on the remedies available. 85 Their utility is thus limited
for plaintiffs who seek to challenge government employees’ allegedly unconstitutional actions. As a result, many plaintiffs have chosen to sidestep Eleventh Amendment concerns by bringing legal actions against local municipalities and other political subdivisions instead, which are not
rendered immune from suit by the Eleventh Amendment. 86
As plaintiffs have turned to litigation against local and municipal
governments and entities, local and municipal governments have simultaneously evolved and created new boards, authorities, and commissions
in the name of expanding state services and emphasizing privatization,
revenue-sharing, and decentralization. 87 With ever-expanding and decen-

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).
Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167 (2003).
83 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that plaintiffs may sue a state official in
their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing federal law
violation).
84 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-60 (holding that Congress cannot abrogate states’
sovereign immunity pursuant to its powers under Art. I § 8 of the United States Constitution,
commonly known as the Interstate Commerce Clause, but can use its powers under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
85 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (allowing plaintiffs to sue state officials in their
official capacity for prospective injunctive relief); but see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74 (refusing to apply the Ex parte Young exception where Congress has “prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right”).
86 See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Lincoln Cty. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
Plaintiffs’ ability to sue a municipality for constitutional violations is nevertheless limited because plaintiffs seeking to hold a municipality liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must clear
Monell’s heightened threshold of causation. As a result, today’s federal dockets are “replete
with cases . . . where immunities and the municipal causation requirement conspire to immunize local governments and their officials for conduct that violates the Constitution.” Fred
Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 464 (2016).
87 Jameson B. Bilsborrow, Keeping the Arms in Touch: Taking Political Accountability
Seriously in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 64 EMORY L.J. 819, 822
(2015); Linda Lobao, The Rising Importance of Local Government in the United States: Recent Research and Challenges for Sociology, 10 SOC. COMPASS 893, 897 (2016); Rogers, supra note 76, at 1244; see also Keon S. Chi et al., Council of State Governments, Privatization
in State Government: Trends and Issues, SPECTRUM: J. ST. GOV’T, Fall 2003, at 13,
https://perma.cc/F968-CKSK; John Joseph Wallis & Wallace E. Oates, Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Decentralization in the Public Sector: An Empirical Study of State and Local Government, in FISCAL FEDERALISM: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 5 (Harvey S. Rosen, ed., University
of Chicago Press 1988), https://perma.cc/XS22-Y5SU.
81
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tralizing local governments, plaintiffs can sue a “limitless” variety of government entities. 88 Each time they do, the presiding court must determine
whether that entity is truly local. If the entity is situated sufficiently
closely to the state, the court will consider the entity an “arm of the state”
and thus immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment despite any
seemingly local character. 89
III. THE ARM-OF-THE-STATE DOCTRINE’S HAPHAZARD EVOLUTION
The Supreme Court’s Articulation

A.

The Supreme Court has never issued a definitive framework for how
to conduct the arm-of-the-state inquiry, and three Supreme Court cases
represent the doctrine’s modern canon. 90 In 1977, the Court recognized in
Mt. Healthy School District Board of Education v. Doyle that Eleventh
Amendment immunity may apply to lesser government entities that have
such a close relationship with the state as to be “arm[s] of the state.”91
The Court considered whether a local public board of education in Ohio
was entitled to state sovereign immunity in a suit by a district school
teacher who had been fired. 92 The Court balanced factors relevant to determining whether the nature of the governmental entity in question
makes it more like an arm of the state or more like a municipality or political subdivision. 93 Finding it relevant that Ohio law’s definition of
“state” did not include local school districts, and that the school board had
“extensive” financial powers and freedom, the Court ultimately concluded that the district’s status under state law and its ability to generate
its own revenue outweighed the state’s financial assistance and administrative involvement. 94 The district was “more like a county or city than . . .
like an arm of the State” and thus not entitled to immunity. 95 However,

Bilsborrow, supra note 87, at 821-22.
See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280.
90 In response to the Court’s silence on how to apply the arm-of-the-state analysis consistently, the circuit courts have instead each crafted their own tests, with sometimes contradictory results. See discussion infra Section III.B.
91 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280.
92 Id. at 281-83.
93 Id. at 280.
94 Id.
95 Id. The Court also noted that the district board received a “significant” amount of
money from the state of Ohio and some guidance from the state’s board of education, but the
district board’s financial independence and the exclusion of local school districts from Ohio
law’s definition of “state” outweighed those considerations. Id.
88
89
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the Court did not explain the relative weight of the factors that it considered and did not indicate whether courts should consider other factors. 96
Mt. Healthy was not the first time the Court had considered dismissing a suit on sovereign immunity grounds without the state’s being formally named as a defendant: the Court had long held that, where a state
is the “real, substantial party in interest,” regardless of the named defendants, the suit should be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 97 But prior
cases where courts had found the state to be the real party in interest were
cases in which, if damages were to be awarded, there would be “no doubt”
that they would come directly from the state treasury. 98 Mt. Healthy was
not such a case, and thus suggested that a lesser government entity might
share such a close relationship with the state that—so as to protect the
state’s interests—the entity should be protected from suit by state sovereign immunity regardless, even though the state’s treasury may not be
responsible for any ultimate payment. 99
In the 1979 case of Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, the Court considered whether the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (“TRPA”), a bi-state government entity, was entitled to state
sovereign immunity. 100 Private landowners sued the TRPA, a bi-state
compact between California and Nevada, alleging that the agency had
adopted a land-use ordinance and engaged in other conduct that destroyed
the petitioners’ property values. 101 While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, from which the petitioners appealed, concluded that TRPA received state sovereign immunity because it exercised a “specially aggregated slice of state power,” 102 the Supreme Court rejected the circuit’s
“expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment.” 103 The Court concluded
that the TRPA could not claim sovereign immunity based on six factors:
(1) the agency’s characterization in the language of the compact; (2) the
local government’s role in appointing the agency’s directors; (3) the local,
Héctor G. Bladuell, Twins or Triplets?: Protecting the Eleventh Amendment Through
a Three-Prong Arm-of-the-State Test, 105 MICH. L. REV. 837, 838-39 (2007); Rogers, supra
note 76, at 1263.
97 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents,
535 U.S. 613 (2002)).
98 Jonathan W. Needle, Note, “Arm of the State” Analysis in Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 6 REV. LITIG. 193, 207 (1987).
99 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280; Bilsborrow, supra note 87, at 826.
100 Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 393 (1979).
101 Id. at 394.
102 Id. at 400 (quoting Jacobson v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1359
(9th Cir. 1977), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979)).
103 Id. at 400.
96
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non-state source of the agency’s funding; (4) the municipal nature of the
agency’s function; (5) the state government’s inability to veto the
agency’s actions; and (6) the state’s lack of financial responsibility for the
agency’s liabilities and obligations. 104 For the first time, the Court also
examined the state’s intent in creating the entity and the entity’s actual
operations. 105
The Court acknowledged that, even though some agencies exercising
state power had previously been allowed to invoke the protections of the
Eleventh Amendment, those agencies had been found immune from suit
“in order to protect the state treasury from liability that would have had
essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the
State itself.” 106 In articulating when state sovereign immunity applies to
governmental entities, the Lake Country Estates Court cited two prior
cases where immunity was at issue specifically because the state was the
real party in interest due to the state treasury’s ultimate responsibility for
any monetary award. 107 The Court thus drew a connection between the
arm-of-the-state and real-party-in-interest doctrines and underscored the
importance of the state treasury’s direct involvement in both. 108
As parties continued to raise the issue of state sovereign immunity
for local governmental entities, lower courts struggled to apply the Mt.
Healthy and Lake Country Estates holdings, and the Second and Third
Circuits eventually reached different conclusions about the same bistate
entity, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. The Third Circuit, which concluded that the Port Authority was an arm of the state for
purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, stated that Lake Country Estates did not set out an “exclusive list of factors to be considered” in an
arm-of-the-state inquiry and conducted an inquiry based on the six Lake
Country Estates factors as well as Port Authority’s function, power to sue
and be sued, and immunity from state taxation. 109 The Second Circuit, on
the other hand, found that the Port Authority was not an arm of the state
and thus not immune from suit. 110 While the Second Circuit also used the
Lake Country Estates factors, the court found that the sixth factor—

Id. at 401-02; Bladuell, supra note 96, at 839.
Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401.
106 Id. (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459 (1945)).
107 Id. at 401 n.18.
108 Id.; see also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977); Bilsborrow, supra note 87, at 826.
109 Port Auth. Police Benev. Ass’n, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 819 F.2d 413, 417
(3d Cir. 1987), abrogated by Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
110 Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1989), aff’d, 495
U.S. 299 (1990).
104
105
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whether the agency’s liability would place the state treasury at risk—was
“the single most important factor” in determining whether an agency was
intended to be an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.111
In holding that the Port Authority was not entitled to sovereign immunity,
the Second Circuit emphasized that, in cases where the state is not the
defendant, the “exposure of the state treasury” is “critical” to finding
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and cited to cases which granted such
immunity under the real-party-in-interest doctrine. 112 The Supreme Court
resolved the split by concluding that the states had waived any immunity
and did not address the differences in the circuits’ arm-of-the-state analysis. 113
Four years later, in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, the Court recognized but did not resolve the circuits’ confusion.114
Acknowledging that the various “indicators of immunity” had pointed the
Second and Third Circuits in different directions, 115 the Court reemphasized that shielding the state’s treasury from liability was the “most salient
factor” in Eleventh Amendment determinations. 116 The Hess Court went
on to incorporate the Eleventh Amendment’s “twin reasons for being”—
the protection of the state’s treasury and dignity interests—explicitly into
its arm-of-the-state analysis. 117 Pointing to the Port Authority’s financial
self-sufficiency, the Court ultimately held that there was no concern as to
state solvency or dignity and upheld the Second Circuit’s finding that the
Port Authority is not immune from suit. 118
B.

Chaos Amongst the Circuits

Although Hess provided lower courts with some guidance as to how
they might apply the arm-of-the-state analysis, the Supreme Court did not
clarify which factors courts should consider, how heavily they should
weigh those factors relative to each other, or how the twin reasons are
involved in the analysis. 119 The result has proven nothing less than chaotic: every circuit has developed its own version of the arm-of-the-state
Id. at 631.
Id.
113 Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990).
114 Hess v. Port. Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
115 Id. at 47.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 47-48.
118 Id. at 39-40, 47-48, 52.
119 See Bilsborrow, supra note 87, at 827-29 (questioning whether the twin reasons are a
second stage of analysis after the reviewing court first considers the various arm-of-the-state
factors, or whether the twin reasons function as a “prism” through which the factors should
then be “refracted”).
111
112
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test, which in turn has produced scores of inter- and intra-circuit divergence as to which governmental entities are and are not arms of their respective states. 120 Some circuits have attempted to revise their arm-of-thestate analyses in light of Hess, 121 while others have maintained that their
analyses are consistent with Hess’ approach. 122
Each federal circuit uses between two and seven factors to determine
whether a governmental entity is an arm of the state that receives Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 123 The factors fall into five broad categories: (1)
whether the entity performs local or state functions; (2) the degree of state
political and administrative control over the entity; (3) the entity’s powers
and financial autonomy from the state; (4) the entity’s characterization by
state law; and (5) whether the state treasury would ultimately pay any
judgments against the entity. 124 The inquiry is ultimately one into the entity’s status under the Eleventh Amendment, but because the criteria are
so difficult to define, circuits apply the arm-of-the-state analysis on a factintensive, case-by-case basis. 125

See infra notes 129-48.
E.g., Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R., 647 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing the First
Circuit’s decision to “reformulate [its] analysis as a two-part inquiry whose steps reflect[] the
Eleventh Amendment’s twin concerns for the States’ dignity and their financial solvency”
raised in Hess). Muddying the waters even further, this revision is in name only; the substance
of the court’s analysis remains the same. Id. (“[T]he ‘reshaping’ of our law did not represent
an actual change in the substance of the analysis.”).
122 E.g., P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 531 F.3d 868, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (reading Hess as “confirm[ing] that we must apply the three-factor arm-of-the-state test and look
to state intent, state control, and overall effects on the state treasury.”); Ernst v. Rising, 427
F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing the Sixth Circuit’s four-factor based approach as
“similar” to that of the Supreme Court).
123 For an in-depth description of each circuit’s arm-of-the-state test and examples of its
application, see 17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 123.23[4] (3d
ed. 2013).
124 Rogers, supra note 76, at 1269.
125 Id. at 1272.
120
121
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The First Circuit uses a two-part test that requires the analysis of
seven additional factors. 126 The Second Circuit has two tests: one considers six factors, 127 the other two, 128 and both emphasize the importance of
protecting the state’s treasury. 129 The Third Circuit holds that, in some
cases, whether an entity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity can
be determined summarily from the statutes establishing and governing the
entity. 130 On the other hand, where evidence beyond statutory language is
required, the Third Circuit uses a three-factor test that gives each factor
equal weight, 131 although the Third Circuit has historically ascribed the
Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr.
Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2003). In administering this test, First Circuit courts ask
whether the state has structured the entity to share Eleventh Amendment immunity and
whether there is a risk that money damages will be paid from the state treasury should the
entity be found liable. To answer those two questions, First Circuit courts consider up to seven
factors, including: (1) whether the agency has the financial power to satisfy judgments without
involving the state; (2) whether the agency’s function is governmental or proprietary; (3)
whether the agency is separately incorporated; (4) how much control the state exerts over the
agency; (5) whether the agency can sue, be sued, and enter contracts; (6) whether the agency’s
property is subject to state taxes; and (7) whether the state has immunized itself from liability
for the agency’s acts. Id. at 62 n.6 (quoting Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer
Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 939-40 (1st Cir. 1993)).
127 Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1996). Under this
test, Second Circuit courts first consider six factors: “(1) how the entity is referred to in the
documents that created it; (2) how the governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how
the entity is funded; (4) whether the entity’s function is traditionally one of local or state government; (5) whether the state has a veto power over the entity’s actions; and (6) whether the
entity’s obligations are binding upon the state.” Id. If those six factors “point in different directions,” circuit courts then consider Hess’ twin rationales for the Eleventh Amendment and
ask whether allowing the entity to be sued in federal court will threaten the integrity of the
state or expose the state treasury to risk. Id.
128 Clissuras v. City Univ. of N.Y., 359 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2004), supplemented, 90 F.
App’x 566 (2d Cir. 2004). Under this test, Second Circuit courts consider (1) whether a judgment against the entity would render the state responsible for paying the damages, and (2) the
extent of the state’s control over the entity. Id.
129
Mansuco, 86 F.3d at 293; Clissuras, 359 F.3d at 82. The Second Circuit’s use of two
distinct arm-of-the-state tests is perhaps due to Pikulin v. City University of New York, 176
F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 1999), which specifically discussed the status of the City University of New
York (“CUNY”) as an arm of the state. Pikulin was based in turn on a series of district court
opinions issued before Mancuso that had discussed CUNY’s arm-of-the-state status. See, e.g.,
Burrell v. City Univ. of N.Y., 995 F. Supp. 398, 410–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Minetos v. City
Univ. of N.Y., 875 F. Supp. 1046, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Moche v. City Univ. of N.Y., 781
F. Supp. 160, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d without opinion, 999 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1993); Scelsa
v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Silver v. City Univ. of N.Y.,
767 F. Supp. 494, 499 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d on other grounds, 947 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1991); Ritzie
v. City Univ. of N.Y., 703 F. Supp. 271, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
130 Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010).
131 Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2005). The three
factors that the Third Circuit considers are: (1) whether any money damages that result from
the entity being held liable will come from the state treasury; (2) the agency’s status under
126
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most importance to whether the state treasury would pay any damages
arising from the entity’s liability. 132 The Fourth Circuit considers four
non-exclusive factors, 133 the most important one being the state treasury’s
potential responsibility. 134 The Fifth Circuit’s test uses six factors, 135 with
the source of an entity’s funding being the most important. 136 The Sixth
Circuit uses four factors and gives the most weight to the state’s potential
liability. 137 The Seventh Circuit’s test has two factors, one of which has
five subparts, with financial autonomy the more important factor. 138 The
Eighth Circuit uses a two-factor test, the ultimate question being whether

state law; and (3) the agency’s degree of autonomy. Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations,
Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989).
132 Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659-62.
133 S.C. Dep’t of Disabilities & Special Needs v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 535 F.3d 300,
303 (4th Cir. 2008). The Fourth Circuit considers: (1) whether any judgment against the entity
will be paid by or inure to the benefit of the state; (2) the degree of autonomy exercised by the
entity; (3) whether the entity is involved with local or state concerns; and (4) how the entity is
treated under state law. Id.
134 Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2014).
135 Providence Behavioral Health v. Grant Rd. Pub. Util. Dist., 902 F.3d 448, 456 (5th Cir.
2018). The six factors are: (1) whether state statutes and case law view the agency as an arm
of the state; (2) the source of the entity’s funding; (3) the entity’s degree of local autonomy;
(4) whether the entity is concerned with local or statewide problems; (5) whether the entity
can sue and be sued in its own name; and (6) whether the entity has the right to hold and use
property. Id.
136 Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1991).
137 Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005). Sixth Circuit courts consider: (1)
the state’s potential liability for a judgment against the entity; (2) the language that state statutes and state courts use to refer to the entity and the degree of state control over the entity;
(3) whether state or local officials appointed the entity’s administrative officers; and (4)
whether the entity’s functions are that of state or local government. Id.
138 Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Kashani v. Purdue Univ.,
813 F.2d 843, 845–47 (7th Cir.1987)). The Seventh Circuit considers the entity’s financial
autonomy and its general legal status; in analyzing the entity’s financial autonomy, Seventh
Circuit courts evaluate “the extent of state funding, the state’s oversight and control of the
entity’s fiscal affairs, the entity’s ability to raise funds independently, whether the state taxes
the entity, and whether a judgment against the entity would result in the state increasing its
appropriations to the entity.”
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the state is the real party in interest. 139 The Ninth Circuit uses five factors, 140 with the state’s potential liability the most important. 141 The Tenth
Circuit uses a four-factor test. 142 The Eleventh Circuit analyzes four factors 143 in light of the defendant’s function when taking the challenged action. 144 Finally, the D.C. Circuit uses a three-factor test. 145 All of the circuits consider the entity’s source of funding or financial independence in
some way, but no two circuits use the same test. 146
In deciding whether to grant Eleventh Amendment immunity to governmental entities, the circuits use nebulous factors that they do not weigh
in any consistent manner, which creates unpredictable and occasionally
conflicting results. 147 This raises fundamental concerns for litigants who
seek to challenge practices, like fines and fees, of what would seem at
first blush to be obviously municipal bodies, like municipal courts.

139 Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys. of Mo. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 640 F.3d 821, 827 (8th Cir.
2011). Eighth Circuit courts examine the degree of an entity’s independence from the state
and whether a money judgment would implicate the state treasury. Id. But see United States
ex rel. Fields v. Bi-State Dev. Agency of Mo.-Ill. Metro. Dist., 872 F.3d 872, 877 (8th Cir.
2017) (applying a six-factor test).
140 Sato v. Orange Cty. Dep’t of Educ., 861 F.3d 923, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2017). Ninth Circuit
courts consider (1) whether a money judgment against the entity would be satisfied by state
funds; (2) whether the entity performs central government functions; (3) whether the entity
may sue or be sued; (4) whether the entity can take property in its own name or only the name
of the state; and (5) the entity’s corporate status.
141 Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat. Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997).
142 Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007). Tenth Circuit courts analyze: (1) state law’s characterization of the entity; (2) the entity’s autonomy
under state law and the degree of control the state exercises over the entity; (3) the entity’s
state funding and ability to issue bonds or levy taxes on its own behalf; and (4) whether the
entity in question is concerned primarily with local or state affairs. But see Watson v. Univ.
of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing a two-part arm-of-thestate analysis).
143 Ross v. Jefferson Cty. Dep’t of Health, 701 F.3d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003)). Eleventh Circuit courts consider: (1)
how state law defines the entity; (2) the state’s degree of control over the entity; (3) the source
of the entity’s funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity.
144 Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003).
145 P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 531 F.3d 868, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2008). D.C. Circuit courts consider: (1) the state’s intent as to the entity’s status, including the functions it
performs; (2) the state’s control over the entity; and (3) the entity’s overall effects on the state
treasury.
146 See supra notes 126-45.
147 See discussion supra Section III.A; Rogers, supra note 76, at 1243-44.
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IV. MUNICIPAL COURTS, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, AND THE NEED FOR AN
ARM-OF-THE-STATE TEST CONSISTENT WITH THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
A.

Municipal Courts Are More “Municipal” Than “Court”

Municipal courts illustrate how the expansion of local governments’
and their simultaneous privatization and decentralization can lead to a
governmental entity that both makes hyperlocal decisions and is claimed
to be an arm of the state by municipalities defending against debtors’
prison lawsuits. 148 The National Center for State Courts defines municipal
courts as stand-alone trial courts with limited jurisdiction that are funded
“largely by a local unit of government.” 149 In many states, these courts
are created by towns or cities 150 and receive exclusively local funding.151
As a result, municipal courts are frequently entangled with other municipal branches of government: for instance, in Missouri, municipal court
employees often work for both the court and for their city’s executive
office, and many report to city officials working in the finance department. 152 Court administrators and clerks who report to city finance directors or officials have reported that their “city uses the court for one of their

See sources cited supra notes 52, 54-55, 58, 87.
Municipal Courts Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
https://perma.cc/8PVV-PC4E (last visited Nov. 21, 2019).
150 See,
e.g., About the Nevada Judiciary, SUPREME COURT OF NEV.,
https://perma.cc/LY69-B6NV (last visited May 10, 2019) (“Each of these [municipal] courts
is funded by the city . . . .”); An Overview of the Utah Justice Courts, UTAH COURTS,
https://perma.cc/8SYD-AF8K (last visited May 10, 2019) (“Justice Courts are established by
counties and municipalities . . . .”); Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, WASH. COURTS,
https://perma.cc/YM56-DJKJ (last visited May 10, 2019) (“Municipal courts are those created
by cities and towns.”); Indiana Trial Courts: Types of Courts, IND. JUDICIAL BRANCH,
https://perma.cc/DQF7-UGM9 (last visited May 10, 2019) (“City and town courts may be
created by local ordinance (local law).”); Municipal Court, S.C. JUDICIAL BRANCH,
https://perma.cc/P6ET-DHWQ (last visited May 10, 2019) (“The council of each municipality
may establish, by ordinance, a municipal court to hear and determine all cases within its jurisdiction.”); Municipal Courts, N.D. COURTS, https://perma.cc/LMB7-A9SM (last visited May
10, 2019) (“Each municipality under 5,000 in population has the option of deciding whether
or not to have a municipal court.”); Municipal Courts, WIS. COURT SYSTEM,
https://perma.cc/82XJ-PGGW (last visited May 10, 2019) (directing municipalities interested
in creating a municipal court towards a set of resources); The Supreme Court of Georgia History, Municipal Courts, SUPREME COURT OF GA., https://perma.cc/NB84-27W5 (last visited
Nov. 21, 2019) (“Cities and towns in Georgia establish municipal courts . . . .”).
151 See sources cited supra note 150; State Court Structure Charts, COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://perma.cc/3T96-YX9E (last visited May 10,
2019) (offering summaries of all fifty states’ courts’ structure, jurisdiction, and funding
sources).
152 Lawrence G. Myers, Judicial Independence in the Municipal Court: Preliminary Observations from Missouri, 41 CT. REV. 26, 27 (2004), https://perma.cc/4R5U-N8FP.
148
149
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main sources of income.” 153 Locally funded, locally established, and locally staffed, municipal courts—which take on tens of millions of cases a
year and are the only way that most residents come into contact with the
judicial system 154—are thus quintessentially local entities which in turn
are used to raise revenue for their cities and towns. 155
Where courts have focused their arm-of-the-state inquiry on a municipal court’s funding or level of local control—two Lake Country factors that circuits tend to emphasize in their arm-of-the-state analyses—
municipal courts have not received Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit. 156 Moreover, while municipal courts are technically part of their
state’s judicial system, 157 they do not share the same jurisdictional or
practical characteristics as other state courts. 158 State judicial systems are
comprised of trial courts, mid-level appellate courts, and a highest court,
typically the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. 159 Municipal courts sit
below all of these courts and are so specific to their town or city that even
the National Center for State Courts does not mention them in its summary of state court systems. 160 It is thus disingenuous to paint municipal
courts as identical to state trial or appellate courts, which have in the past
been held to be arms of the state.161

Id. at 28.
See, e.g., Janet G. Cornell, Limited-Jurisdiction Courts: Challenges, Opportunities,
and Strategies for Action, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 67, 69 (2012)
https://perma.cc/G76S-85UY (discussing limited jurisdiction courts’ high case volume and
interaction with residents); The Municipal Courts of New Jersey, N.J. COURTS,
https://perma.cc/3R8Z-S9YV (last visited May 10, 2019) (“It is through the Municipal Courts
that most citizens in the State come into contact with the judicial system . . . .”).
155 See discussion supra Section I.A.
156 Kirkland v. DiLeo, No. 12-cv-1196 (KM), 2013 WL 1651814, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Apr. 15,
2013), aff’d, 581 F. App’x 111 (3d Cir. 2014); In re Brown, 244 B.R. 62, 69 (Bankr. D.N.J.
2000).
157 See Municipal Courts Resource Guide, supra note 149.
158
See sources cited supra notes 150-51, 154.
159 Comparing Federal & State Courts, U.S. COURTS, https://perma.cc/JGA2-PR8B (last
visited May 10, 2019).
160 National Center for State Courts, The Who, What, When, Where and How of State
Courts, VIMEO (Nov. 8, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://vimeo.com/299681452.
161 E.g., Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987),
superseded by statute on other grounds, as recognized in Alexis v. County of Los Angeles,
698 F. App’x 345, 346 (9th Cir. 2017); Harris v. Mo. Ct. of App., 787 F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir.
1986); Dolan v. City of Ann Arbor, 666 F. Supp. 2d 754, 764-65 (E.D. Mich. 2009), aff’d,
407 F. App’x 45 (6th Cir. 2011); Jones v. Winters, No. 4:09CV00019 BSM, 2009 WL 764539,
at *3 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 19, 2009); NAACP v. State of California, 511 F. Supp. 1244, 1257-58
(E.D. Cal. 1981), aff’d, 711 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1983). Notably, many of these circuit-level
opinions, which courts later cite when granting state trial courts sovereign immunity, were
decided before Hess and thus do not incorporate the Supreme Court’s most recent guidance
on the arm-of-the-state analysis’ overarching intent.
153
154
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In the context of debtors’ prison litigation, municipal courts should
not receive Eleventh Amendment immunity not only because they are unlike the rest of their state’s judicial system but also because they are not
acting on that system’s behalf. 162 When court employees like clerks and
judges—who frequently report to their city’s executive branch—charge
defendants fines and fees in order to generate municipal revenue, 163 the
municipal court acts not as part of the state judicial system but as part of
and on behalf of its municipality. 164 While the Supreme Court has on one
occasion suggested in dicta that, where local governments provide judicial services, they are “typically” treated as arms of the state for Eleventh
Amendment purposes, 165 the Court has not clarified whether municipal
courts are included in that definition.
Given that municipal courts’ practice of charging fines and fees is
driven by municipal revenue generation, not by the “fair administration
of justice,” 166 the court’s function seems more municipal than judicial.
Thus, municipal courts charging fines and fees act as part of the municipality they sit in—and municipalities are not protected from suit by the
Eleventh Amendment. 167 But the confused state of the arm-of-the-state
doctrine means that litigants cannot predict when courts will recognize
this reality.
B.

The Arm-of-the-State Analysis Should Reflect the Eleventh
Amendment’s Intent

Given the Supreme Court’s ambiguous guidance on the arm-of-thestate analysis, federal circuits’ divergent approaches, and the ever-expanding role of local government, the arm-of-the-state doctrine should be

See sources cited supra notes 150-53.
See sources cited supra notes 151-53, 154; discussion supra Section I.A.
164 See supra notes 16, 24.
165
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 527 n.16 (2004) (“[J]udicial services [are] an area in
which local governments are typically treated as ‘arm[s] of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment
purposes . . . .”) (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)).
Notably, none of the cases that were cited to support the Supreme Court’s dictum involved
municipally funded municipal courts.
166 FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 24, at 15. When municipal court employees impose
fines and fees with the express purpose of increasing municipal revenue—and do so in close
concert with non-judicial branches of the local government—they participate in a scheme that
has no underlying judicial rationale. “The purpose of courts is to be a forum for the fair and
just resolution of disputes, and in doing so to preserve the rule of law and protect individual
rights and liberties.” NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, PRINCIPLES ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES 2 (2018),
https://perma.cc/H6S3-9E2L. The use of debtors’ prison practices thus undermines the court
system’s judicial function for pecuniary gain. See also sources cited supra notes 17, 31, 33.
167 See sources cited supra note 86.
162
163
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refocused to more fully embody the Supreme Court’s twin rationales for
sovereign immunity 168 and the historical basis for the Eleventh Amendment. 169
One possibility, as suggested in an article which has been cited by
the Supreme Court and numerous federal courts, 170 is confining the test
to two inquiries that promote structural federalism 171: (1) how state law
defines the governmental entity; and (2) whether the governmental entity
is empowered to generate its own revenue. 172 Author Alex E. Rogers describes the threshold question that courts should address as whether the
state enabling act that created the entity expresses—in unmistakably clear
language—that the state intends to designate the entity as an arm of the
state. 173 This approach embodies the Supreme Court’s reliance in both Mt.
Healthy and Lake Country Estates on the state law’s explicit language
concerning the entity in question. 174 If the state statute does not clearly
articulate an intent to designate the entity as an arm of the state, the court
should consider whether the entity has the independent power to raise its
own revenue. 175 Only those entities that are not empowered to generate
funds through means such as “the issuance of debt” should be granted
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 176 This two-part analysis is consistent

Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1994).
See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934).
170 E.g., Hess, 513 U.S. at 59; P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 531 F.3d 868, 879
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Beentjes v. Placer Cty. Air Pollution Control Dist., 397 F.3d 775, 780 (9th
Cir. 2005); Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & Caribbean Cardiovascular
Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 62 n.5 (1st Cir. 2003); Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 432 n.3 (4th Cir.
1995).
171 For an in-depth discussion of structural federalism, a theory fundamental to the relationship between the state and federal governments, see Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and
the Structural Constitution: Navigating the Separation of Powers Both Vertically and Horizontally, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 4 (2015); Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
483 (1998).
172 Rogers, supra note 76, at 1296. The author notes that courts have blended multiple
facets of the financial relationship between the entity and the state, and that the question of
whether the state treasury will ultimately be held liable is frequently unresolvable because
enabling statutes do not always mandate that the state satisfy the entity’s judgment. Id. at
1294-95.
173 Id. at 1288-91. This heightened level of inquiry into the state’s law reflects the “clear
statement” requirement for congressional abrogation and state waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson
Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1990); Siegel, supra note 82.
174 See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401-02
(1979); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
175 Rogers, supra note 76, at 1305.
176 Id.
168
169
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with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of at least part of the Eleventh
Amendment’s intent as protecting the state treasury from liability for
judgments against a non-state governmental entity. 177 If the entity cannot
generate its own funding and relies entirely on state funding, any judgment will logically come from the state treasury, and the Eleventh
Amendment will protect the entity from suit, but if the entity both generates its own revenue and receives state funding, courts will have to engage
in a fact-based inquiry to determine the extent of the entity’s ability to
generate its own revenue. 178 However, because the proposed analysis focuses solely on the entity’s financial autonomy, rather than the speculative impact of a judgment on the state’s treasury or future funding for the
entity, courts will not be forced to conduct the same kind of intensive
analysis that they currently undertake. 179
Other commentators have proposed: focusing on the state’s intent to
provide the entity with immunity, the state’s legal and practical liability
for the judgment, and whether the entity serves a state or local function;180
reframing the inquiry to be one about political accountability, specifically
considering whether the state’s interests sufficiently coincide with the entity’s affairs; 181 and asking instead only whether the basis of jurisdiction
is diversity of citizenship or federal question. 182 While these approaches
rightfully attempt to make sense of the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s ambiguity, they do not accomplish the necessary task of both simplifying
courts’ analyses and integrating the rationales for Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
Because they do not resolve the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s ambiguity and do not explicitly address funding, these proposals will engender
either continued inter-circuit divergence or a move away from the original
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment—or both. The two-factor approach
more accurately addresses the shortcomings of the arm-of-the-state doctrine in its current form.
Based on the twin reasons for the Eleventh Amendment, protecting
the state’s treasury and “dignity,” 183 a governmental entity’s financial independence and status under state law are appropriately paramount con-

Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1994).
Rogers, supra note 76, at 1308.
179 Id.
180 Bladuell, supra note 96, at 852-53.
181 Bilsborrow, supra note 87, at 849.
182 Anthony J. Harwood, A Narrow Eleventh Amendment Immunity for Political Subdivisions: Reconciling the Arm of the State Doctrine with Federalism Principles, 55 FORDHAM L.
REV. 101, 120 (1986).
183 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1994).
177
178

138

CUNY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:113

siderations in the arm-of-the-state analysis: in the age of local government, 184 it has never been more important that municipalities and municipal courts not be able to hide behind the cloak of state sovereign immunity.
CONCLUSION
The rise of modern-day debtors’ prison practices and debtors’ prison
litigation reveal the need for renewed attention to the arm-of-the-state
doctrine’s disarray. The Supreme Court’s limited precedent has not provided sufficient guidance for the federal circuits, which have in turn produced divergent arm-of-the-state analyses with inconsistent results. Based
on the doctrine in its current form, municipal courts should not be immune
from debtors’ prison suits—but litigants cannot predict that courts will
come to that conclusion. There is thus a pronounced need for a more coherent arm-of-the-state test that reflects the Eleventh Amendment’s intent. Courts would be wise to center two factors in their analysis: the entity’s status under state law and the entity’s financial independence. Under
this more precise articulation of the arm-of-the-state inquiry, it becomes
clear that municipal courts which charge defendants fines and fees in order to generate revenue for themselves and for the municipality in which
they sit should not be immune from suit. As locally established, locally
staffed, and locally and self-funded entities, municipal courts must be
held liable for their debtors’ prison schemes.

184

Lobao, supra note 87, at 897.

